This article undertakes an empirical analysis of M&A-related risks based on evidence from eight listed U.S. bank holding companies over the period 2000-10. The research model is designed as an inter-domain risk matrix encompassing idiosyncratic and systematic risks underlying horizontal and conglomerate M&A. Risk impact is measured by critical performance metrics at corporate and environmental levels in the pre-and post-M&A periods. It was found insignificant relationship between synergy and concentration and marginal priority of financial over operating synergy in the post-M&A realm. While systematic risk can be mitigated by horizontal M&A followed by majority ownership, its adverse effect is insurmountable for institutions resulted from conglomerate M&A.
Introduction
The banking industry critically depends on macroeconomic dynamics and is rigorously regulated.
To survive in volatile environment and maintain competitive advantage, banks strategize higher productivity and efficacy through organic or inorganic, or combination of both, evolution. One of the regularly employed elements of inorganic growth is mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which to date have demonstrated a proven significance in facilitating growth at a firm-specific level as well as in tailoring industry landscape.
Despite general positivism, a number of M&A produce inconsistencies and detract or destroy value of the resulting (post-M&A) institutions. M&A failures are of serious concern of corporate executives, shareholders, and regulators. Macroeconomic tumultuousness further exacerbates risk of post-M&A value deficiency thus challenging consolidation movement at large. It is therefore obvious that M&A enable, and not secure, banks to amplify their growth capabilities and sustainability to systematic risk 1) . The odds of deteriorating scenarios bring to the forefront the issue of risk management at both micro-and macro-levels with the purpose to minimize adverse effect of economic uncertainty and turmoil. In fact, criticality of risk management is oftentimes understated owing to lopsided focus on primarily micro-level aspects of M&A and excessive prioritization of instantaneous post-M&A benefits. Such an approach not only is flawed by predominantly short-run quantitative effects but also misses other fundamentals of the M&A process, especially in its integration phase.
This article is an attempt to narrow down the risk-related gap in the M&A knowledge and practice and to systematize important risk factors from risk management heights. It suggests some 1) Hereinafter systematic risk is viewed through its two domainssystematic risk at macroeconomic (upper) level and systematic risk of the banking industry (lower) level. Based on the above premises, this article addresses the following questions:
 What types of risks underlie M&A processes and what is their probabilistic effect on strategic objectives of the resulting banks?
 Whether and to which extent post-M&A concentration attributes to synergetic effect?
 Whether geographic diversification enhances post-M&A resilience to systematic risk?
 Whether and to which extent conglomerate M&A (between bank and non-bank institution) affects acquiring bank's sustainability to systematic risk and how to measure its effect?
 Do M&A mitigate risk of deteriorating performance ensued from environmental uncertainty and turmoil?
The following hypotheses are tested in this article aiming to enlighten aspects put forth in the above panel of questions:
Hypothesis 1. Post-M&A synergy meaninglessly depends on capital market concentration of the resulting bank.
Hypothesis 2. Post-M&A diversification withstands systematic risk, if and when a consummated M&A deal results in acquiring bank"s majority ownership in the acquired bank.
Hypothesis 3. Post-M&A integration is exposed to the risk of failure unless it is sustained by adequate stock market performance of the resulting bank.
Hypothesis 4. Post-M&A conglomerates mitigate endogenous fluctuations and decline in the banking industry thus contributing to market equilibrium.
The research model is designed as a cross-domain risk matrix embedding idiosyncratic and systematic risks and horizontal and conglomerate M&A transactions. Risk impact is measured by critical performance parameters at micro-and macro-levels in the pre-and post-M&A periods of the panel banks.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 covers literature review highlighting theories and empirical findings of the previous investigations in the subject area.
Section 3 presents research methodology applicable to the innovative methods of M&A risk measurement. Section 4 is a place of testing hypotheses based on research methodology followed by analysis and discussion of the results. Section 5 summarizes the research outcome and concludes on recommendations to banks and regulators, while Section 6 sets scope for further research.
Literature Review
Extant academic literature demonstrates conflicting findings on measuring post-M&A outcome while scarcely elucidates how M&A risks could be mitigated. Some core M&A aspects like whether operating or financial synergy 2) is superior in contributing to post-M&A value creation as well as links to regulation and macroeconomic parameters are still missing their holistic analysis and understanding. Moreover, findings are short of unbiased and comprehensive realization of other environmental factors challenging post-M&A realm. This academic gap coupled with fragmentary 2) Post-M&A operating synergy is defined by the accounting-based performance measures and is expressed by profitability of the resulting institution that exceeds profitability of each of the pre-M&A institutions taken together. Post-M&A financial synergy is defined by market capitalization of the resulting institution that exceeds market capitalization of each of the pre-M&A institutions taken together. 5 and episodic research of M&A-driven forces (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999, pp.1, 3) triggers indetermination and misconception of risk-originated factors underlying M&A. On the other side, dearth of relevant theoretical basics and bases aggravate further synthesis of various academic foci in the field (Haleblian et al., 2009 ) thus refraining their validity for organizational settings and industry regulators.
Capital Market Concentration and Synergy.
In recent decades, expeditious development of M&A processes and avalanching post-M&A challenges have dramatically changed the landscape of post-M&A concentration, market configuration, and competition. Search for logics in measuring relationship between concentration and synergy urged Berger and Hannan (1989) to synthesize 'price-concentration' relationship.
They observe that higher concentration engenders inadequate performance behavior resulting in mispricing 3) and abnormal returns due to poor adjustment of deposit rates in concentrated markets followed by completion of the M&A deal. Later on, Berger and Hannan (1998) observe that higher concentration instigates corporations to mechanistically exercise maximization of profits and shareholder value and again come to conclusion that such a simplified approach elicits cost inefficiency, mispricing, and welfare loss and may ultimately ruin strategic intent. Chatterjee (1992) further posits that synergy depends on concentration thus multiplying bank's competitive capabilities; he however provides no evidence of attainability of synergy in isolation from concentration. Houston, James and Ryngaert (2001) observe that value creation attributes to post-M&A cost efficiency while Peltzman (1977) states that the latter determines 'concentrationprofitability' correlation. Cogman and Tan (2010) conclude that 'maximization of post-M&A return 3) Higher rates of fees and commission (that is, exceeding the average level in a particular market), which is a direct consequence of increased market concentration and poorer competition.
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-minimization of risk of failure' dilemma urges banks to set a balanced combination of post-M&A benefits, including concentration, and costs.
Although causal relationship between concentration and profitability is acceptable to riskefficient policy, Smirlock (1985) draws an inference that concentration is secondary to market capitalization and is associated with competition, while abnormal returns stem from lower costs and higher prices are linked to accounting measures only. At the same time, his study is limited by onebank corporations and lacks analysis of bank holding companies (BHC). Some other findings also gravitate to efficiency, rather than performance-structured, doctrine. Thus, by analyzing linkages between concentration and increased competition, Demsetz (1973) suggests that concentration derives from corporations' (and industry's)
"…superiority in producing and marketing products or in the superiority of a structure of industry in which there are only a few firms" (p.1).
Overall, past researches on 'concentration-synergy' relationship results in conflicting findings and are not less than fragmented by region or industry analyses. To overcome this gap, it is attempted to determine sensitivity of this relationship through focused and deeper analysis of dependence of synergy on concentration. Their relationship is tested in Hypothesis 1.
Ownership, Diversification, and Systematic Risk.
There are handful academic works on intrinsic value of synergy gain for the M&A parties. Among them is Lubatkin's (1987) who observe shared benefits for shareholders of the acquirer and the acquired companies upon M&A deal consummation. Sudarsanam (2003) expands these findings to shareholder wealth increment analysis concluding that M&A outcome has a disadvantageous effect for acquirer's shareholders while shareholders of the target company are benefited by abnormal returns. According to Houston and Ryngaert (1994) , this effect sometimes is attained at the expense of the acquiring bank's owners. Zollo and Singh (2004) and Bogan (2009) banks were expanding within their home states or adjacent territories, which required comparatively simpler set of post-M&A performance efficiency metrics. During almost two recent decades, the U.S. banking sector has witnessed an exponential variety of cross-industry, cross-border, and crossproduct diversifications, each with unique parameters and strategic rationale. In their impressing work, Berger and DeYoung (2001) found that diversification had both positive and diminishing effects on post-M&A efficiency, and that the negative effect is escalating along with subsidiaries' increasing distance from their headquarters. Nevertheless, network economies outstrip negative effect by benefits from risk transfer. Grabowski, Rangan and Rezvanian (1993) , conversely, posit that geographic diversification increases post-M&A risk of failure proving it by comparative analysis of BHC and branch banking institutions. Their stance on riskier activity mirrors in Demsetz and Strahan (1997) who observe the same pertaining to the changed structure of the combined assets. Cornett and Tehranian (1992) respond to this discussion by comparative study of intrastate and interstate pre-and post-M&A performance applying both accounting and market performance appraisals and stating that diversification positively affects profitability. Their conclusion is consistent with Rhoades (1993) who found that improved performance was a consequence of combined deposit base as well as cost reduction. Mishra et al. (2005) observe that horizontal M&A significantly reduce idiosyncratic risk, while risk diversification is a main driving force of consolidations. Keeley's (1990) conclusion summarizes the above findings in that diversification 8 has little exposure on market concentration but provides banks with higher returns. Strengthening this kaleidoscope of opinions by Lubatkin's (1987) stance that shareholders' gain from consolidation is subject to majority ownership, it becomes undoubtedly clear that there still remains gap in understanding the relationship between synergy and ownership, on the one side, and diversification and systematic risk, on the other side. Realization of this linkage in Hypothesis 2 will help comprehend whether diversified M&A coupled with majority post-M&A ownership withstand systematic risk.
Risks in Post-M&A Value Creation.
Post-M&A synergy is a tacit primary objective of any consolidation and realization of synergetic effect is an indispensable element of sustainable development. However, binary (operating and financial) synergism is yet to be rationalized by as to which of its components more realistically reflect post-M&A efficacy. In other words, dilemma of superiority of the measuring instruments is opened for possible alternate considerations. An array of findings favoring or denying their significance still keeps the space vacated for additional, more conclusive arguments.
Among the proponents of operating synergy are Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) who found stable increase of profits of the resulting banks and observed decrease of total risk due to diversification. In contrast, Pilloff (1996) did not find any improvements in profitability. Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2009) conclude on insignificant role of financial synergy in generating post-M&A total synergy owing to its meager (17%) portion compared to operating synergy (p.1181). Besides, Aharony and Swary (1981) and Isimbabi and Tucker (1997) by linking both types of synergies validate operating benefits as a factor encouraging investors' confidence.
However, Meeks and Meeks (1981) warn on excessive reliance on operating synergy stating that "… no inferences for efficiency could be drawn solely from evidence of improved profitability after merger" (p.335), 9 which is partly consistent with Templeton and Severiens (1992) arguing that market return data "… serve as indicators of investor perceptions about BHC conditions and prospects" (p.5).
Further, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) by analyzing operating synergy in conjunction with post-M&A risks opine that increased credit portfolios, which are associated with expected returns and consequently operating synergy, may signify riskier performance. Their observation is consistent with Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey's (1997) findings in that refocus to high risk strategy may impair revenues. The above discussion urges to solidify the issue of superiority of either type of synergy and to investigate whether inadequate post-M&A stock market performance affects post-M&A value creation that is a centerpiece of Hypothesis 3.
Conglomerate M&A and Systematic Risk.
Despite the fact that banking industry dynamics is highly vulnerable to systematic risk, this phenomenon has received scarce academic attention. Its significance for stakeholders is proved by high (20-30%) contribution to corporations' aggregate return (Chatterjee, Lubatkin and Schoenecker, 1992, p.139; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997, p.301) , deficiency of which may seriously weaken post-M&A integration. Academic discussions in the field are ramified by proponents of related M&A (Palepu, 1985; Hoskisson et al., 1993) as the only platform for 'M&A-making' in the banking industry that can sustain systematic risk, and unrelated consolidations with their resilience to macroeconomic uncertainties (Chatterjee, 1986; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988) . Among other scholars doubting the capability of conglomerate corporations to minimize detrimental effect of systematic risk are Templeton and Severiens (1992) and Demsetz and Strahan (1997) .
In Section 2.2, the discussion was centered on interrelatedness between systematic risk and horizontal M&A. Regulatory liberalization in the late 1990s raises criticality of conglomerate M&A for steady development of the financial sector. Supported by evidence from the unrelated M&A wave in the U.S. banking industry in the first decade of 21st century, recent investigations into conglomerates capture more plausible results. Thus, Bösecke (2009) believes that unrelated M&A decrease systematic risk due to less erratic profit fluctuations and incongruous revenue cycles that are front line factors securing continuous liquidity, cost-efficiency, and competitiveness. In development of these findings, Ng (2007) further concludes that acquirers with heterogeneous resource base receive comparatively higher synergy than their peers from horizontal M&A. Bajtelsmit and Ligon (1996) opine that banks' penetration to insurance sector reduces shareholders' risk through economies of scope. While some academic studies hesitate effective exposure to nonbank activities (Boyd, Graham and Hewitt, 1993) , Brewer's (1989) conclusions are further strengthened by specific methodology linking risk measurement to market-based, not to accountingbased, indicators. Obi and Emenogu (2003) observe reduction of total risk and enhanced performance followed by conglomerate M&A while Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) At the same time, many experts associate the most recent recession with financial liberalization originated from Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 4) (GLBA) that legitimated M&A between banks and nonbank financial institutions. Their concern was ultimately materialized in some provisions of Dodd-Frank Act 5) (DFA) that has imposed certain restrictions on banks' M&A resulting in conglomerates.
However, strategizing synergies generated from different industries seems to remain a strong platform in effective immobilization of macroeconomic risks; in other words, conglomerates mitigate adverse effect of systematic risk through inter-industry diversification and enhanced capability of resource redeployment that is consistent with Amihud and Lev (1981) . Besides, 4) Also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. 
Research Methodology
The research was conducted on evidence from eight listed U.S. bank holding companies 6) each with equity/assets exceeding $100 billion and customer deposit base covering almost 80% of the national banking industry. They have evolved to industry leaders through multiple sophisticated M&A, and inorganic expansion is believed to be a solid contributor to their sound performance and hypotheses variables is presented in Table 1 . All data related to statistical observations are parametric and are based on Bayesian theory of hypotheses probability (logics of the applied objectivist principles) and have continuous normal distribution.
place Table 1 however, to delve into behavioral aspect of the relationships between variables and to reduce 7) HHI is an official measuring instrument of capital market concentration as stipulated by Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. It is a sum of squares of deposit shares of each bank operating in a particular state.
13 observational errors stem from concentration sampling error, frequency of HHI was increased from annual to quarterly basis through linear interpolation of CAPCON 8) (Y i2 ). As such, Spearman"s normal (N) and interpolated (I) rank correlation coefficients (ρ i(N;I) ) are applied to each M&A observation specified by OPERSYNER (X i1 ) and FINSYNER (X i2 ) covering the entire (pre-and post-M&A) research horizon (X i1H and X i2H in case the acquiring bank was presented in the local market prior to the M&A event), and post-M&A period (X i1P and X i2P ) for the remainder M&A deals:
where R is rank of the engaged variables, according to Spearman's rank distribution criteria, as of particular date in the observed M&A period; n is number of calendar quarters in the observed M&A period. , where X 0 and X 1 are HHI as of 30th June of the two nearest years, n is a number of the observed sub-periods (quarters) within the period to which X 0 and X 1 belong to. 14 presented in Table 2 and further grouped in Table 3 
Based on criteria of credibility of intervals of high and low correlations, coefficient's intervals
where STD i(H;R) is standard deviation of mean indicators for each of the above variables for the entire research horizon and recession sub-period; M i(H;R) is arithmetic mean of mean indicators for each variable for the research period as above, H and R denote entire research horizon and recession sub-period respectively. Formula (2) is further transformed to demonstrate inclusion of specified variables of the two sampling groups:
where S and B denote sample banks and peer banks; n is number of observations. Importance of mean volatility is in its aggregated single indication of variables' volatilities that is comparable with identically single volatility of the stock market indicators variable.
This hypothesis is further tested for statistical significance by Student"s t-test for the entire research period and recession sub-period. Stem from inequality of statistical population of the sample banks and U.S. peer banks t-test (t i(H;R) ) is specified for unequal sample sizes with equal variances:
where M i is mean of each observed variable of the sample as well as peer banks for both the entire research horizon and the recession sub-period; STD i(S) is standard deviation of the sample banks (n 1 ) pertaining to each variable computed for the research horizons as above; and STD i(B) is standard deviation of the U.S. peer banks (n 2 ) pertaining to each variable computed for the research horizons as above.
Denominator (n 1 +n 2 -2) applies to degrees of freedom (DF) of different sample sizes 9) in testing statistical significance. Although chosen arbitrarily, a statistical significance level is: α=0.05. Pvalue is computed for each variable for the entire research horizon and recession sub-period aiming to find the extent to which M&A consummated with majority ownership of the acquiring bank withstand systematic risk. Computed indicators of volatilities and t-test are presented in Table 4 . 
where STD i(P1;P2) is standard deviation of revenue and market capitalization of the sample banks in the pre-M&A period (P 1 ) and the post-M&A period (P 2 ); M i is arithmetic mean of each variable pertaining to the observed M&A patterns. Formula (5) 
where n is number of observations of a particular variable in the relevant research horizon.
Volatilities of variables pertaining to each M&A transaction are grouped in Table 5 . Student"s tdistribution (Table 6) 
where M i is mean of each of the observed variables of the sample banks in the pre-M&A period (either PREREV or PRECAP) and post-M&A period (either POSTREV or POSTCAP) (mean indicators of variables of more than one M&A event are averaged to an aggregated mean); STD (PREREV;PRECAP) is standard deviation of homogeneous variables for the pre-M&A period; and STD (POSTREV;POSTCAP) is standard deviation of homogeneous variables for the post-M&A period.
DF equals to 14 10) . P-value is computed for each pair of homogeneous population of variables to reveal which of the variables more realistically measure post-M&A performance consistency.
Although volatility of operating and financial variables at different stages of the M&A process explicitly demonstrates the degree of their significance in measuring post-M&A integrity, it would be judicious to complement this model by identification of superior measure in relation to CAPCON 10) 2n-2 where n=8.
by linking mean correlation coefficients of each pair of variables (OPERSYNER/CAPCON and FINSYNER/CAPCON) within the specified variances pertaining to the correlation interval, which shows the highest frequency of occurrences (see Table 3 ). The following formula applies:
where STD i(Yi1;Yi2) is standard deviation of normal and interpolated correlation coefficients as per Table 3 for the entire (H) and post-M&A (P) research horizons for OPERSYNER/CAPCON and FINSYNER/CAPCON for the each observed M&A deal; M i is arithmetic mean of correlation coefficients pertaining to each pair of variables for the research horizons as above. Based on basics of formula (6), formula (8) is further transformed to include rank correlation coefficients (ρ i ) for both pairs of variables for normal and interpolated distributions for the research horizons as above:
where n is number of observations of each pair of variables for each M&A pattern.
In Hypothesis 4, testing is based on comparative analysis of variables of the acquiring bank (NONROA, NONCAP, and NONPRI) and their aggregated equivalents at macroeconomic level. Table 7 , based on which it is concluded on the degree of volatility of conglomerate M&A to systematic risk.
Since testing involves unequal sample sizes with equal variances, t-test is based on formula (4) for each pairs of homogeneous variables (NONROA/USROA, NONCAP/USCAP, and NONPRI/USPRI) for the observed period. However, to minimize observational error, DF of each group of variables for each sample bank differ depending on sample sizes implying that DF (NONROA/USROA_L) = 115 11) , DF (NONCAP/USCAP) = 25 12) , and DF (NONPRI/USPRI) = 500 13) :
Limitations of the Research.
The research results are affected as per Berger et al.'s (2004) findings that synergies differ in short- Act 14) could be modified so that to expand economically-driven principles of organizational growth and to elevate competitive advantage of the U.S. banks to a more sustainable level during economic meltdowns.
Empirical Findings and Analysis / Discussion of Results
Hypothesis 1 testing is based on 14 horizontal M&A occurrences over the period 2001-07.
place Table 2 about here Analysis of correlations for OPERSYNER/CAPCON and FINSYNER/CAPCON revealed weakening effect of each of the synergy variables on concentration after the M&A event as well as their predominantly weak relationship between both pairs of variables at large (Table 3) .
place Table 3 
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Evidence of insignificant level of correlation is also associated with another aspect of quantitative outcome. It derives from dilemmatic behavior of M&A managers in strategizing concentration at a micro-level: Excessive maximization of customer deposit base is inevitably counterbalanced by concatenating regulatory requirements in the framework of mandating performance and prudential ratios, on the one side, and maintenance of competition in the banking industry, on the other side.
place Table 4 about here Further, test for statistical inference reveals that p-value of OWNER_CFEA and OWNER_ER are not statistically significant, especially in the indicative recession sub-period. P-value of the remaining variables is statistically significant. In general in this testing, p-value points lopsidedness of statistical significance among variables. Obviously, in terms of profitability and prudential ratios, sample banks demonstrate vulnerability to systematic risk. However, they effectively cope with it by asset redeployment and cost optimization. These merits overweigh statistical significance of other variables: Mean p-value is 0.1141, which is comfortably higher the conventionally accepted threshold of 0.05. Following the above examination, Hypothesis 2 is accepted.
Hypothesis 3. Although it is generally accepted that post-M&A efficiency depends on improved market capitalization of the resulting institution, the latter's stock market performance necessitates further examination as to whether it is a sole critical factor of post-M&A consistency and whether operating synergy should also receive equally important status in contributing to post-M&A smoothness.
place 
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(V POSTCAP(A) ) is found from contributing macroeconomic volatilities in pre-recession (equilibrium) and recession periods using the following formula:
where V POSTCAP is mean volatility of POSTCAP (Table 5) ; V is contributing volatility at macroeconomic level equal to 2.81% (S&P, 2010) computed for the period of market equilibrium (2000 -Q2-2007) ; V is contributing volatility at macroeconomic level equal to 5.76% (S&P, 2010) computed for the recession sub-period (Q3-2007 -Q1-2010).
Using the above formula, V POSTCAP (A) = 4.0%. Compared to PRECAP volatility, adjusted POSTCAP volatility decreased by 0.88 basic points.
Another evidence of lower stock market performance volatility can be drawn from synergyconcentration analysis (see Hypothesis 1). Volatility of FINSYNER/CAPCON is lower to OPERSYNER/CAPCON by around 6 basic points (Table 3) place Table 6 about here The results display almost equal relevance of both operating and financial synergies in measuring post-M&A risks. However, individual p-value indicators vary within both populations of variables causing some sort of research confusion. For higher research objectivity and to minimize observational error, the results are reassessed by means of aggregated means, following which pvalue of market capitalization variables demonstrates that it is not statistically significant, and under these circumstances, Hypothesis 3 is accepted.
For testing Hypothesis 4, it was selected 7 conglomerate M&A deals consummated by the sample banks (resulted in their transformation to financial holding companies, FHC) in the analyzed period.
The confined research base is however outweighed by variables of different performance characteristics of the sample group so that the results would have the highest possible research objectivity (Table 7) .
place Table 7 about here Volatility of NONROA of the sample banks is lower compared to that of the peer banks, which signals that the sample banks possess higher operating sustainability in withstanding systematic risk. This conforms to Bösecke (2009) who found direct correlation between conglomerate M&A and the decrease of systematic risk that is a prerequisite of generating stable post-M&A revenue streams. However, her findings ramify with Templeton and Severiens' (1992) and Demsetz and Strahan's (1997) disbelief in conglomerates' operating elasticity. These polar conclusions may stem from time difference in research meaning that in the contemporary business environment, conglomerates have developed sophisticated and reliable mechanisms of post-M&A integration including future profits. In this circumstance, Bösecke's (2009) opinion implicitly specifies that at least operating synergy should be treated as a measuring instrument of post-M&A integration followed by cross-industry consolidations. Mean of individual volatilities of NONCAP is higher than of USCAP; however, volatility of their aggregated mean shows the opposite correlation. This once again testifies higher aptitude of FHC to macroeconomic challenges, mostly due to their ability of risk transfer by redistribution of resources and liquidity among their business units as well as higher flexibility in product management (types, prices, markets, etc) . At the same time, volatility of NONPRI is significantly higher than USPRI. Nevertheless, it is assumed that dynamics of NONPRI stands secondary to NONCAP, since the latter incorporates consolidated market capitalization of the resulting FHC while NONPRI relates solely to the acquiring bank because the 26 target companies are not listed at the stock exchanges. Furthermore, higher volatility of NONPRI is attributable to economies of scope of the sample banks, since their extensive coverage of national and global markets increases their sensitivity to crisis developments, which during the most recent recession were characterized by omnipresence throughout the world.
place Table 8 
Conclusion
The research results elucidate principally new aspects of measuring risks in post-M&A integration.
It was found that neither type of tangible synergy depends or affects concentration, even if the latter is strategized to maximize post-M&A operating and financial benefits. It is maintained that excessive emphasis on concentration may entail a reverse effect in both the short-run period (for example, shrinkage of deposit base due to unexpected attrition of customers dissatisfied with those aspects of integration that lacked improvement as an inevitable result of concentration-minded policy; inflexibility in 'de-risking' sensitive performance areas such as loan products, and so on) and long-run perspective (threat of monopolization and adverse impact on market competition followed by non-compliance with regulatory requirements and deal abandonment).
It was revealed that post-M&A majority ownership coupled with geographic diversification of the resulting BHC protects U.S. credit institutions from environmental risks through risk transfer and redistribution of assets. However, absolute control may seriously affect post-M&A performance owing to the fact that the sole major shareholder becomes entirely responsible for M&A deal conduct and strategy implementation while its inaccurate decision-making may put the M&A process at significant risk. Findings also show that FHC, compared to BHC and other types of traditional credit institutions, possess higher potential in coping with systematic risk due to stable revenue streams and adequate stock market performance ensued from cross-industry diversification and risk transfer. However, their well-balanced post-M&A strategy is weakened by overlooking or misconceptualizing a series of both evident and tacit risk factors at a macro-level, which means that their M&A conduct lacks holistic management. At the same time, there is no evidence the extent to which FHC might sustain crisis should it had been limited by their 'host' industries alone (that is, industries, which legal entities of FHC were initially originated from). As such, it would be premature to draw any inference from fallacy of their business models, as was suggested by experts doubting in financial liberalization and adequate performance of the U.S. banking conglomerates. Risk-oriented regulatory reality would not only facilitate 'microeconomic-macroeconomic' fit but also set an impetus for rethinking M&A with non-financial companies 16) . Otherwise, the existing regulatory restrictions coupled with upsurge of globalization and expansion-minded economic regulations in the other countries may result in outperformance of U.S. credit institutions by their overseas rivals followed by serious weaknesses in their competitive advantage and growth perspectives.
Scope for Further Research

Further Research as an Enabler in Overcoming M&A Gaps.
Further insight into M&A's behavioral aspects could be comprehended by comparative analysis of synergy of the resulting banks of specified assets/equity categories and further stratified by those with prior experience in the target market and those without that. This research would be a launch pad for rethinking strategies onto interstate M&A in that how to secure acquirer's smooth post-16) M&A between financial and non-financial sectors are prohibited by Glass-Steagall Act.
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M&A integration regardless its past exposure to the local markets but considering its size.
Additionally, delving into interrelatedness between acquirer's size, its local market expertise, and adequacy of synergetic effect would enable to elucidate post-M&A factors that are the most critical in value creation in the mid-and long-term perspectives as well as in ensuring sustainability to systematic risk.
Investigation into 'synergy-diversification' relationship should be expanded over at least three earlier decades to understand the variety of M&A driving forces as well as sources of synergy during non-diversified activities under the ban on interstate consolidations. Based on new findings, more risk-related factors at micro-and macro-levels could be revealed and integrated into "M&A risk matrix" and risk management mechanism.
Another research aspect in the field is M&A continuum. Commonly, M&A decision-making is refrained by fears of macroeconomic uncertainty and poor liquidity. At the same time, decline of corporations' market value motivates high performers and growers to realize value creation through M&A-making. Such an antagonistic dilemma suggests that M&A yet will remain one of the primary tools of inorganic growth; however, to mitigate possible discouraging effect stemming from macro-level, further investigation into M&A processes should be focused on finding homogenous and heterogeneous risk factors, which would best fit during post-M&A integration.
In the course of M&A continuum is DFA's innovation in regulation of FHC. Thus, it treats company as predominantly financial (that is, subject to industry regulation), if its revenues from the main activity or from financial assets constitute not less than 85% of total revenues (DFA, Sec.102, p.17) . It implies that the remaining FHC would be ill-supervised and become more vulnerable to systematic risk. To understand whether the above threshold would ensure stability of the U.S. financial sector, an optimal solution could be drawn from situational analysis on how other than 85% cut-off thresholds would impact FHC performance during macroeconomic instability.
Future research should more emphasize unrelated M&A and conglomerates' performance. Still, many scholars doubt in benefits of cross-industry M&A (see, for example, Thompson, 1984) or believe in their mediocre post-M&A performance as well as incongruity of earnings streams that may themselves alone exacerbate systematic risk (Gahlon and Stover, 1979) . Testing results of 
Further Research as a Promoter of Paradigm Shift.
In the recent decade, M&A patterns have reflected inflating mass of new and varying stimuli and impediments. It has become more difficult to maximize the number of post-M&A value-driven components. In addition, rapidly changing macroeconomic environment is perhaps the main perilous and unmanageable factor discouraging M&A continuum. As such, the latter cannot be further maintained unless the traditional quantitative and qualitative factors of M&A conduct are complemented by, and linked to, risk evaluation criteria and approaches. "M&A risk matrix" is an inevitable milestone in paradigmatic transformation from value-minded principles, which prioritize mostly immediate benefits to risk-minded business philosophy, which would highlight 'deriskization' of post-M&A integration for a longer perspective. Indeed, hidden risks may destroy post-M&A value irrespective of its actual increment. Notes: 1. Due to occurrence of some M&A events in early/late 2000s and unavailability of earlier/later statistical data, the research period for those instances is limited to less than 6 years as against 3+3 research horizon approach. 2. NA (not applicable) means that the acquiring bank was not present in the target market prior to the M&A event. 1. For M&A with two and more occurrences, variables and their standard deviations are averaged to their means. 2. Sstatistically significant; NSnot statistically significant.
